Louay M. Safi
Cross-cultural dialogue is a recurring theme in international human rights literature. Some
human rights scholars underscore the need for a cross-cultural discourse for transmitting human
rights concerns and practices to non-Western societies, while others dismiss the call for engaging
non-Western cultures in a dialogue as counterproductive, since it can only lead to compromising
the universality of human rights.1
The purpose of this paper is to point out inconsistencies in the work of some leading
human rights scholars, involved in assessing human rights trends in the Middle East, who
advocate a cross-cultural approach to understanding human rights in non-Western cultures. I
argue that a close examination of what is referred to as a cross-cultural dialogue reveals
unmistakable elements of hegemonic discourse. It is quite evident that many human rights
scholars specializing in the study of Islam and the Middle East are not engaged in a two-way
communication with Islamic reformers, so that a better understanding of the context and
direction of Islamic reform may be attained, but rather in a hegemonic discourse whose effect
has been the overshadowing of a reformist discourse rooted in Islamic worldview.
I stress, however, that the distorted picture that comes out of this hegemonic discourse
does not stem out of any malicious intent to mislead, but rather is due to conceptual and
methodological reasons. Methodologically, the approach to studying human rights situations in
the Middle East is ahistorical and static, failing to detect actual developments in discourse and
practice, and unable hence to reveal the vigorous cultural reform currently underway in the
Muslim world. Conceptually, the distortion in the picture of the human rights debate in the
Middle East is due to the fact that observations are filtered through an absolute-universalistic
outlook, oblivious to the importance of the notions of culture, cultural variation, and cultural
dynamism on understanding human rights situations.
I further contend that while Islamic reform has a long way to go before it can ensure
individual liberty and equality for all, it has been moving slowly but consistently toward a vision
of an open, egalitarian, and tolerant society, and that it has already embraced international human
rights as defining principles of its vision of future society. I conclude by identifying the
preconditions for a genuine cross-cultural dialogue, and cautioning against attempts to subvert
human rights by employing human rights as a tool to justify imposition of external values and
choices, rather than an instrument for fighting coercion and imposition.
THE MAKING OF A HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE
The value of scholarship derives from its ability to bring meaning and enlightenment to the lives
of people, and to sharpen their understanding of the complex world in which they live. All
scholars realize that in order to bring about clear understanding, and to explain actions and
events in the complex world of humans, this world must be reduced into a managable set of
concepts. However, for a complex world to be reduced without distortion, scholars must take
special care to maintain balance among the various elements and componants that constitute it.
The failure to maintain balance, say by failing to reflect the size and significance of the various
forces locked in an intellectual or political struggle, is bound to bring about misunderstanding
rather than understanding, and to create an ugly image out of the most beautiful object of
understanding. Distortion is thus the most fatal act a scholar can commit.
The importance of human rights lies in the instrumental role they play to protect the
weak against the powerful, and to liberate the oppressed from their oppressors. It is widely
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concludes that Islamic human rights schemes are effectively undermined when read through the
eyes of traditionalist spokesmen of Islam. By relying extensively on the traditionalist
interpretations of shari’a Mayer is, therefore, able to make a persuasive case to support her thesis.
Her persuasiveness is attained, however, at the expense of sacrificing clarity, and omitting crucial
facts. One such a crucial fact missing in Mayer’s work is the intense debate currently underway
between Islamic reformers and traditionalists on the relevance of pre-modern shari’a to modern
Islamic society. Indeed, Mayer herself realizes, in the context of critizing the use of shari’a for
defining the scope of individual freedom in the Iranian Constitution, the slippery nature of her
arguments, and poses an important question that goes into the heart of her contention:
Could it not be the case, one might ask, that the Islamic qualifications on rights might be
narrower than the ones permitted under international law, that these clauses could be
interpreted to mean that the government would have to produce much stronger
justifications for curbing human rights than it would under secular criteria? That is, one
might say that the assumption that broad Islamic qualifications on rights imply the
erosion of rights protection is only that — an assumption.4
Mayer immediately dismisses the doubts raised in the above question, insisting that “[a] lthough
in the abstract this question might seem justified, there are indications that warrant the
assumption that these qualifications are designed to dilute rights.”5 She goes on to cite three
grounds for her contention: (1) that the Iranian government excludes “[l]iberal Muslims with
strong commitments to human rights, like Mehdi Bazargan and Muslim clerks like Taleghani,
who believe that Islam protects individual rights and freedoms… .,”6 (2) that Middle Eastern
governments in general are “hostile to claims on behalf of individual liberties and the rights of
the citizens,”7 and (3) that there is “no developed tradition of Islamic human rights protections.”8
Yet it is not difficult to show, on a closer examination, that the grounds cited by Mayer
are fragile, and do not warrant her assumption. Thus the first point she advances supports the
contention I raised earlier that she is relying on traditionalist interpretations of shari’a while
obscuring the role of Islamic reformers in bringing about profound sociopolitical change to
Muslim society. For Mehdi Bazargan is himself a leading figure in the Islamic reform movement
that contributed to the demise of the authoritarian regime of the Shah. He was a member of the
committee that drafted the Iranian Constitution, and the first prime minister in post-revolution
Iran. He continued to work toward the creation of an open, egalitarian, and tolerant Islamic
society after he was pushed to the opposition by the traditionalist policies of the Ayatollahs until
his death. His efforts, and those of other Islamic reformers, gave rise to a vibrant reform
movement, opposing the conservative regime in Iran. The movement has recently succeeded in
dislodging the conservatives from the executive branch, bring more moderate government under
Khatami.
Similarly, to argue that Middle Eastern governments are “hostile to claims on behalf of
individual liberties” is to miss the point. For one needs only to remember that these regimes
embrace the ideologies of developmentalism — in their both nationalist and socialist forms —
which justify forced assimilation and cultural imposition, the very ideologies that gave rise to
Islamic reform movements. These governments are, by and large, avowedly antagonistic to
Islamic reform, and have rejected in the past all attempts to base social development on Islamic
values on ethos. The recent efforts on the part of some Muslim governments to incorporate
certain elements of historical shari’a into the law are aimed at gaining the support of traditionalist
jurists in their struggle against Islamic reformers.
Finally, Mayer’s contention that there is “no developed tradition of Islamic human rights
protections” is perplexing, and illustrative of a legalistic approach that lacks sensetivity to cultural
dynamism. For while it is true that historical shari’a does not support a full-fledged system of
human rights protection in modern society, Islamic reformers have been actively engaged, since
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Afghani and Abduh, in efforts to reform traditional shari’a, as it is shown bellow. Still, it is
inaccurate to suggest that one cannot find principles, laws, and doctrines that can provide strong
foundation for Islamic human rights tradition. Indeed, as early as the second century of Islam
(eighth century) Muslim jurists have recognized the rights of non-Muslims to equal protection of
the law as far as their personal safety and property are concerned, as well as their right to full
religious freedom. Thus Muhammad bin Hassan al-Shaybani, the author of the most
authoritative classical work on non-Muslim rights, states in unequivocal terms that when
Muslims enter into a peace covenant with non-Muslims, “Muslims should not appropriate any of
their [the non-Muslims] houses and land, nor should they intrude into any of their dwellings.
Because they [have become] party to a covenant of peace, and because on the day of the [peace
of] Khaybar, the Prophet’s spokesman announced that none of the property of the covenanters is
permitted to them [to Muslims]. Also because they [non-Muslims] have accepted the peace
covenant so as they may enjoy their properties and rights on par with Muslims.”9 Similarly, al-
Shaybani concedes that Christians who have entered into a peace covenant with Muslims have
the right to practice their religion and maintain their Churches, and are entitled to trade freely in
wine and pork in their own towns, even though trade in, and consumption of, the two items is
prohibited to Muslims under shari’a rules.10
Evidently, Mayer’s assumption that shari’a rules are bound to effect excessive restrictions
on Islamic human rights schemes rests solely on reading these schemes through the eyes of the
traditionalists, while keeping the views of reform-minded Muslim scholars and activists in the
background. Indeed, leaving crucial facts and evidence out, while conveniently focusing on
radical and traditionalist elements of Islamic resurgence are characteristic of those human rights
scholars who have been quick to dismiss the profound Islamic reform currently underway in
Muslim societies, and to overlook its anti-traditionalist stance and liberal tendencies and ethos.
Similarly, scholars engaged in hegemonic discourse often water down the negative impact
of the self-serving foreign policies of major Western powers on cultural reform, and on the
maturation of human rights traditions. Thus Bassam Tibi dismisses the selective application of
human rights by Western powers as irrelevant to the debate on human rights practices in the
Middle East, and rejects the complaint of non-Western critics against selective application as
mere polemics.11 He goes further to dennounce non-Western opposition to Western hegemony
as unwarranted resistence “disguised as a claim to cultural authenticity”.12 Tibi does not stop
even once to ask: whence comes this hostility? Nor does he seem interested in finding out
whether the non-West is resisting the principles of human rights themselves, or only Western
interpretations of the mode and scope of their application. In fact Tibi seems to be completely
oblivious to the possibility that non-Western hostility might have to do with the support Western
powers lend to oppressive non-Western regimes, ruled by hated dictators. The hegemonic
nature of the intellectual discourse in which Tibi is engaged is so pervasive that it turns out that
even the notion of “cross-cultural consensus” he vigorously advocates does not involve a
dialogue among autonomous cultures engaged in rational persuasion, but a coercive discourse
that takes the form of monologue through which non-Western cultures are expected to learn the
manners and habits of a presumably morally superior West.13
THE PURPOSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM AUTONOMY TO PATERNALISM
Can international human rights, which borrow their moral and intellectual strength from natural
rights tradition — a tradition that places great emphasis on human dignity and individual
autonomy — be used as an instrument to patronize and control other cultures? The answer to
this question can be found in an article written by a human rights scholar and Middle East
specialist, under the title “An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human
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Rights”.14 The article begins by pointing out certain oppressive practices of the Iranian Islamist
regime, and rightly identifies as the source of these practices the regime’s failure to recognize the
incompatibility of nation-state structures with the historically based Islamic legal system.
However, the author turns, in the second part of his article, to direct his moral indignation of the
Iranian regime at the practice of hijab (Islamic dress) by Muslim women. Rejecting the assertion
by Muslim women that their voluntarily adoption of the hijab signifies a self-expression of their
idea of Islamic decency, and an “affirmation of female autonomy and subjectivity”, Afshari
insists that the assertion is
illusory, more a symptom of a deeply rooted sociocultural malady than a sign of female
autonomy. It is illusory because the precondition that necessitates the adoption of the
hijab is set by the patriarchal reinvigoration of control and dominance, a new bay’a (oath
of allegiance) to male autonomy and subjectivity. It is illusory because the wearer’s
notions of propriety and modesty have internalized the androcentric norms of the
culture.15
The above argument is unmistakably paternalistic, even presumptuous, as it in effect accuses
Muslim women of false counsciousness. Because Muslim women have internalized the
“androcentric norms of the culture”, Afshari contends, their assertion of moral autonomy is an
empty claim. He further goes on to claim that in addition to being sub-consciously misguided,
Muslim women have another reason for wearing hijab, viz. to avoid “those sanctioned practices
that permit harassment of women in public, forcing them to comply with repressive norms and
rewarding them by according them a marked difference in the ways men treat women in
public”.16 The problem of this second argument is not that it has not been substantiated by
facts, but that it is totally contrary to actual practices in most Muslim societies that have
experienced Islamic resurgence. Afshari seems completely oblivious to the fact that in countries,
such as Syria in the early eighties, and Turkey today, the harassment is indeed practiced against
those who wear hijab, rather than those who choose otherwise.17
Afshari’s appeal to human rights as the ground to condemn those who voluntarily assert
their moral autonomy is troubling, not only because of its peculiar logic, but more so because it
draws its strength from the strategic positioning of its author within a hegemonic culture, and
from the strategic formation of a hegemonic discourse on which the author’s arguments feed.
Indeed, Afshari is clear as to the intellectual source that gives him the philosophical ground to
deny to Muslims any claims to cultural authenticity. The philosophical ground, he tells us, is
furnished by Rhoda Howard’s conception of human dignity.18 The question arises, therefore, as
to what conception of human rights and human dignity that drives someone to boldly deny to
Muslims the capacity of experiencing cultural authenticity, and to use international human rights
to prevent Muslim peoples from enjoying their moral autonomy?
Howard has consistantly defined dignity in such a way so as to denote submission to
“society values, customs, and norms”.19 Thus Howard’s conception of dignity – reads
community’s respect of the individual – stands at odd with the notion of human rights, and is no
more the ground for its justification. As she puts it: “Dignity frequently means acceptance of
social rules and norms: human rights implies challenge to precisely those norms. Dignity is often
associated with social constraint, whereas human rights are associated with autonomy and
freedom”.20 According to the above conception, human rights are not an expression of human
dignity, but its negation. No more does dignity rest on the subjective feeling of self-respect and
moral autonomy which motivate a person to demand that others respect his or her moral
choices, but has become completely dependent on the acknowledgement and respect of others.
Haward’s conception of human dignity, which places it at odd with the notion of
universal rights, strikes us as being disinguine. For the very notion of individual rights, advanced
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first by natural rights scholars, is derived from the notion of human dignity. Kant thus argues
that human beings may claim dignity because they are the origin of all values. Unlike the objects
of the natural world which serve as means, and hence have a relative value (or price), human
beings are ends in themselves and have “an intrinsic value – that is, dignity”.21 Human dignity
derives from the fact that the human being is a “rational being who obeys no law other than that
which he [or she] at the same time enact himself [or herself]”.22 The rational volition individuals
possess, which impute relative values to all objects, and enacts universal laws to guide action, is
the source of dignity the moral person may claim. Human rights thus represent mutual
recognition among rational, and morally autonomous, human beings, and affirm the capacity
each of them has for moral self-determination.
Because human dignity denotes the moral autonomy of the individual, it can be best
observed not under favorable social circumstances, when the individual’s moral choices are
agreeable to the established power, but under adverse conditions, when the individual choose to
stick to his/her moral choices even at the peril of invoking the wrath of the power that be. A
person who refuses to change his testimony against corrupt authorities despite a serious threat to
his/her life, or a promise of substantial monetary reward, acts with dignity because he/she
choose to act pursuant to moral principles and universal laws, rather than succumbing to the
arbitrary will of others, or agreeing to sell themselves to the highest bidder. To say that human
dignity “is often associated with social constraint,” as Howard does, is to miss the point. The
respect society shows to those who abide by its moral code signifies reciprocity rather than dignity.
That is, people tend to reciprocate by respecting those who show respect to their moral choices,
and by showing contempt to those who disregard and violate their moral code. Of course
different moral systems demand different levels of conformity, and tolerate varying degrees of
dissent.
In homogenous societies ? such as a tribe or a religious community ? the moral
autonomy of the individual is subsumed in the moral autonomy of the group to which he/she
belongs, and hence his/her dignity lies in observing the tribal or communal norms, and their
refusal to deviate from them under pressure of an arbitrary will of a powerful individual or
group. Reciprocity here lies in ensuring the uniformity of action, and in treating with respect
those who respect the established norms, and with disdain those who ignore and violate
common morality. However, as soon as we move from a homogenous to heterogeneous
societies, where different moral communities live side by side, it becomes obvious that moral
differences have to be normalized and incorporated into the normative system that govern the
heterogeneous whole. Under such circumstances individual autonomy cannot be obtained
unless the moral autonomy of the group to which one belongs is ensured. Under heterogeneous
conditions, which are the conditions of postmodern society, human rights should aim at
protecting the moral autonomy of weaker moral groups against the possibility of forced moral
penetration by powerful groups. Similarly, reciprocity requires that each moral group recognize
that the other groups are entitled to the same moral autonomy they wish to enjoy, and that they
should not insist on imposing their own moral principles, even when they truly believe that these
principles are universally valid, as they would naturally dread that such imposition be directed
against them. The danger of Afshari’s argument that Muslim women who voluntarily choose to
express their notion of Islamic modesty are guilty of having unconsciously succumbed to “the
androcentric norms of the culture”, is that it can be easily turned against the self-expression of
women of any culture, including Western culture.
It should not be difficult, then, to see why the arguments of those who fail to recognize
the autonomy of non-Western moral communities, and who insist to use international human
rights to impose their moral vision on others run contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
international human rights, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).23
If human rights are meant to protect the human dignity and moral autonomy of individuals, one
7
cannot appeal to human rights to force Muslim women to abandon their adopted
hijab under the pretext of false consciousness, as Afshari does.24 I am sure that the Turkish
generals and secular fundamentalists would be glad to adopt the argument of false consciousness
to justify their authoritarian and anti-democratic decree to prevent Muslim women from
adopting their dress style in accordance with their religious conviction, a decree that is
tantamount to religious persecution.
While it is quite legitimate for individuals to advocate their moral views so as to persuade
others of their value and their enriching effects on social life, it is contrary to dignity and justice
for one moral point of view to justify its legal enforcement on the ground of moral superiority.
In the absence of a universally acceptable moral authority, moral superiority can only be
established by moral persuasion. Such persuasion can take place through cross-cultural dialogue.
CULTURAL DYNAMISM AND
THE LOGIC OF ISLAMIC REFORM
The recent interest in studying the compatibility of Islam with human rights came as a result of
the increasing reassertiveness of Islamic beliefs and values in Muslim societies in the last three
decades, a phenomenon widely studied under the rubrics of Islamic resurgence, Islamic
revivalism, or Islamic fundamentalism. The reawakening of religious consciousness in Muslim
societies has been most visible in the political sphere, and has led to the increasing demand by
Islamist groups throughout the Muslim world for the reconstruction of the political and legal
systems so as to bring them into accord with the rules of Islamic law (Shari’a).
But while the various groups and individuals advocating the return of Islam as a source
of public norms, are united in advancing this common goal, they are disparately divided in their
varying visions as to what constitutes an Islamic public order. The diversity in orientations and
visions of Islamic advocates complicates the task of scholars and writers interested in examining
the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence and assessing its social impacts and political
ramifications. Faced with the overwhelming complexity of Islamic reassertiveness, some
scholars chose to ignore the differences that separate various Islamic groups, opting for a
simplistic approach in which the more radical views are taken as representative of Islamic
resurgence. This approach is more popular among international-relations specialists because, it
seems, it coincides with the-worst-scenario analysis favored by national security analysts.25 The
problem of this approach, though, is not only that it reinforces prejudices and distorts realities,
but it also prevents the development of effective foreign policy and undermines the ability of
American policy makers to influence developments in the Muslim world.
The bulk of scholars devoted to studying Islam and the Muslim world have managed,
however, to convey the complexity of Islamic resurgence by grouping the variety of views and
positions into a number of major trends. A wide range of terms have been used by various
authors. The classification list includes such terms as traditionalists, radicals, fundamentalists,
modernists, moderates, liberals, etc.26 Still, the picture which emerges out of an honest and
faithful efforts to depict reality at a specific historical moment can be as misleading and deceptive
as the picture of an acrobat taken few moments after hitting a springboard. The acrobat appears
forever suspended in the air. A person unfamiliar with the gravity force, say a citizen of an
eternal spaceship, would fail to realize that what he observes is a rare moment in the life of
human beings; even a person familiar with the law of gravity would be at loss to determine
whether the framed acrobat is moving upward or downward. Determining the dynamism and
direction of cultural reform in Muslim society, and the positioning of Islamic forces in the course
of societal change, is essential for understanding whether an Islamic political and legal reform is
compatible with human rightsUnfortunately, most of what has been written by human rights scholars on Islam’s
compatibility with human rights overlooks the question of cultural dynamism and
reform direction. Thus we find that an insightful and penetrating work as Mayer’s Islam and
Human Rights succeeds only in revealing the tension over the issues of political reform and
human rights, but not its direction. Her conclusion, therefore, appears ambivalent, if not
perplexing. “[T]he diluted rights in Islamic human rights schemes examined here,” she argues,
“should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam or its inherent incompatibility with human
rights.”27 Islam seems to be the source of both liberation and restriction, of both reformation
and stagnation. The question thus arises as to where does Islam stand in the context of cultural
change?
To begin with, we should recognize that the drive for Islamic reform has intensified as a
result of the realization by Muslim intellectuals that developmentalism ideologies, advocated by
Muslim ruling elites, have not led to any meaningful political or social progress in Muslim
societies, but have instead resulted in the entrenchment in power of a self-serving ruling class
whose main goal is to maintain a lavish lifestyle. In post-colonial Muslim societies, ruling elites
have worked hard for, and succeeded in, creating for themselves and their cronies islands of
plenty in the midst of oceans of poverty. Many Muslim intellectuals, alienated by the highhanded
strategies of developmentalism, became convinced that the only viable political and legal
reform is one rooted in the moral commitments of the Muslim community.
Since its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century, Islamic reform movement has
rejected the traditionalist interpretations of Islam, and embarked on an ambitious reform project,
aiming at relating Islamic beliefs and values to modern life.28 The works of Afghani, Abduh, and
Redah ? the founders of what has been termed the reform school — present us with an
unmistakably egalitarian and liberal discourse, emphasizing openness and tolerance. Early
reformists rejected the anti-intellectual approach of traditionalist jurists, and advocated a rational
and critical reading of the works of classical Muslims. They rejected, for instance, the restrictive
role assigned by traditionalist jurists to women, emphasizing the importance of women’s
education and social participation. Indeed, as early as the 1930, Muhammed Rashid Ridah not
only did advocate the right of women to education and social participation, but also their right to
political participation.29 Similarly, al-Kawakibi attributed cultural decline of Muslim society to
denial to women the right to education, and stressed the importance of their public involvement
for their ability to provide proper guidance and sound upbringing for children.30
While reformist scholars were, and continue even today to be, outnumbered by their
traditionalist counterparts, they have exerted a profound and far-reaching influence on
contemporary society. Their impact can be seen in the increasingly more open views adopted by
leading figures within the traditionalist schools. Several influential and widely respected jurists
within traditionalist circles are on record in supporting democracy, human rights, including the
right of women to compete equally with men for public office.31 The views they express today,
and teach in public, and in shari’a departments of traditional Islamic colleges, would have been
sufficient for them to be branded as heretics just a century ago. Leading scholars of the Azhar
University, such as Muhammad Abu Zahra, Mahmoud Shaltoot, Muhammad al-Ghazali, and
Yusuf al-Qardawi, have been emphasizing equality between men and women, and between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
The views of reformers continue to mature in the direction of recognizing human dignity
and reciprocity in society. Most recently, Fahmi Huwaydi, a leading journalist in the Arab
World and respected Muslim reformist, addressed the question of equality between Muslims and
non-Muslims in a book entitled Muwatinun La Dhimiyun (citizens not dhimis). Huwaydi rejected
the dhimmi classification of non-Muslims as a historically relevant concept, and demonstrated, by
referring to Islamic sources, that non-Muslims in a Muslim political order enjoy full citizenship
rights on par with Muslims.32 The views advanced by Huwaydi is supported by the views of the
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founder and leader of the main Islamic opposition in Tunisia founder and leader of the main Islamic opposition in Tunisia who stresses that non-Muslims
enjoy equal citizenship with Muslim majority.33 Al-Ghanoushi also advocates the right of women
to participate on equal footing with men in public life. “There is nothing in Islam,” he writes,
“that justifies the exclusion of half of the Muslim society from participating and acting in the
public sphere. In fact, to do this is to do injustice to Islam and its community in the first place,
and to women [afterward].”34 Similar arguments for gender equality can be seen in the writings
of leading Shi’i jurists including Murtada Mutahiri, Muhammad Khatami, and Muhammad Mahdi
Shamsuddin.35
Given the continuous expansion and maturation of Islamic reformist views, focusing on
the views of the traditionalists, or on “middle-ground positions” is bound to distort the reality of
cultural reform in the Muslim society, and obscure the direction and dynamism of social change.
To doubt the potential of Islamic reform ? despite the overwhelming evidence of gradual
change of views toward a more liberal and egalitarian position advocated by reformists ?
because of the shortcomings of current reality is tantamount to doubting the liberating ethos of
the declaration of independence at the time of its promulgation because the American society did
not include women and blacks in the notion of “the people”. It took almost two centuries, and a
lot of struggle on the part of countless individuals who strongly believed in human dignity, to
bring these ethos to bear on the reality of social practices.
Again, despite the breathtaking cultural changes that took place in the twentieth century
Muslim societies, we still find scholars who want to convince us that there is such a thing as a
never-changing “Islamic culture”. Thus Tibi is able to make sweeping generalizations on Islam
and Muslim cultures; he writes:
If Muslims are to embrace international human rights law standards full-heartedly, they
need to achieve cultural-religious reforms in Islam ? not as faith but as a cultural and
legal system. In fact, Islam is a distinct cultural system in which the collective, not the
individual, lies at the center of the respective world view. The concept of human rights,
as Mayer rightfully stresses, is “individualistic” in the sense “that it generally expresses
claims of a part against the whole.” The part pointed out by Mayer is the individual who
lives in a civil society and the whole is the state as an overall political structure. Islam
makes no such distinction. In Islamic doctrine, the individual is considered a limb of a
collectivety, which is the umma/community of believers. Furthermore, rights are
entitlements and are different from duties. In Islam, Muslims, as believers, have
duties/fara’id vis-à-vis the community/umma, but no individual rights in the sense of
entitlements.
We are told in one breath that (1) Muslims are in need for cultural-religious reform, (2) Islam is
not a set of values and beliefs that ? like other religions ? give rise to various cultural forms,
but a “distinct cultural system,” and (3) Muslims have only duties towards the community, but
“no individual rights in the sense of entitlements.”
Tibi is not the first to argue that the emphasis in Islam is on duty rather than rights.
Donnelly advances similar arguments when he contends that, “Muslims are regularly and
forcefully enjoined to treat their fellow men with respect and dignity, but the bases for these
injunctions are divine commands that establish only duties, not human rights.”36 Yet these
assertions only reflect the lack of awareness, and possibily access, to the hundreds of voluminous
works in Islamic law which elaborate various rights, and judicial procedures for protecting those
rights, in the historical Muslim society. Suffice it here to give one example from the work of the
classical Muslim jurist al-Mawardi (d. 450 A.H./1086 A..C.). Recognizing people’s right to form
their own views, and to disagree with the prevailing views and dominant social and political
beliefs, he stresses that “if a group of Muslims rebelled by disagreeing with the views of the
community, and forged their own ideology, they are to be left alone and should not be fought,
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